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Abstract 
Entrepreneurs, catalysts for innovation in the economy, are increasingly the 
object of policymakers’ attention. Recent initiatives both in the UK and at 
EU level have sought to promote entrepreneurship by reducing the harshness 
of the consequences of personal bankruptcy law. Whilst there is an intuitive 
link between the two, little attention has been paid to the question 
empirically. We investigate the link between bankruptcy and 
entrepreneurship using data on self employment over 13 years (1990-2002) 
and 15 countries in Europe and North America.  We compile a new index of 
the level of how ‘forgiving’ personal bankruptcy laws are, reflecting the 
time to discharge.  This measure varies over time and across the countries 
studied.  We show that bankruptcy law has a more statistically and 
economically significant effect on self employment rates relative to GDP 
growth, MSCI stock returns, and a variety of other legal and economic 
factors. The results have clear implications for policymakers. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Entrepreneurs are thought to act as catalysts for change in the economy through 
their capacity for innovation and risk-taking. As economies have become 
increasingly ‘knowledge-driven’, policymakers have embraced the idea of 
‘entrepreneurship policy’ with enthusiasm. One mechanism by which 
governments have sought to implement such policies has been through 
bankruptcy law. A ‘forgiving’ personal bankruptcy law, it is thought, will 
increase the supply of would-be entrepreneurs. Based on such thinking, the UK 
has recently lowered the time before a bankrupt may be discharged from pre-
bankruptcy indebtedness from three years to just one year.
1 Similarly, an EU 
initiative has recommended the ready availability of a ‘fresh start’ through 
personal bankruptcy laws as a driver for entrepreneurship (Philippe & Partners, 
2002; European Commission Best Project Expert Group, 2003). Perhaps 
surprisingly, little attention has been paid to whether or not this intuitive 
relationship is borne out empirically, and in particular whether the direction of 
causality is as posited.  
 
This paper reports empirical findings that demonstrate clearly that such a link 
exists. We investigate entrepreneurship using data on self-employment for 15 
countries from Europe and North America over 13 years, covering an entire 
business cycle. We develop a new index of the ‘severity’ of personal bankruptcy 
laws that turns on the number of years a bankrupt must wait until he may be 
discharged (if ever) from pre-bankruptcy indebtedness. Controlling for a range 
of other legal, economic and social factors that may affect national levels of 
entrepreneurship, we show that bankruptcy law has a very pronounced effect on 
levels of entrepreneurship. The paper has generalisable lessons for law reform. 
 
In particular, we show bankruptcy laws have the most statistically and 
economically significant effect on levels of self employment across countries.  
In regards to the economic significance, a 10 year reduction in the time to 
discharge gives rise to an increase in self employment rates by approximately 
1.5% of the average level of self employment per population in the countries 
considered (based on both the Eurostat and Compendia considered herein).   
Changes in bankruptcy laws in Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands, for 
example, changed drastically in the 1990s.  Based on a move from no discharge 
and average life expectancies in these countries, we estimate the bankruptcy 
legislation changes increased self employment per population by 0.006 in 
Belgium (4% of the average level of self employment per population in 
Belgium), 0.008 in Germany (9% of the average level of self employment per 
population in Germany), and 0.009 in The Netherlands (8% of the average level 
of self employment per population in The Netherlands).   2
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
entrepreneurship and its determinants, explaining why the subject is of interest 
and what is known already about its incidence. Section 3 outlines theories about 
how bankruptcy law might affect individuals’ propensity to engage in 
entrepreneurial business activity. Section 4 reports the results of our empirical 
tests, having first described our data and methodology. Section 5 concludes with 
a discussion of the implications. 
 
2. Entrepreneurship and its determinants  
 
2.1 What is entrepreneurship? 
 
The term ‘entrepreneurship’ is used in a range of contexts with widely varying 
meanings. In the neoclassical economic tradition, an ‘entrepreneur’ is simply the 
owner-manager of a (small) business. Such a person receives the residual returns 
from the business’ operations and therefore has the appropriate incentives to 
monitor the agency costs that would otherwise arise from internal team 
production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). However, in the neoclassical tradition 
entrepreneurship ultimately tends to obsolescence, for economies of scale 
dictate increasing firm size to the point lareg amounts of outside capital must be 
raised, ‘closed’ ownership is no longer feasible, and the ownership structure 
shifts towards the more diffuse ‘Berle-Means’ model (Berle and Means, 1932). 
This allows for economies of specialisation to be captured in the separation of 
risk-bearing and control (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991).  
 
Until the mid-1970s, this thinking driven by economies of scale predicted 
economic development in the Western world quite well. Firm size tended to 
increase over time, and a smaller and smaller proportion of GDP and 
employment were tied up with small owner-managed businesses. All this began 
to change, however, by the end of that decade. The logic of globalisation meant 
that worldwide, large corporations began to shift their core plants to countries 
with lower labour costs. Rather, developed nations—now fast becoming ‘post-
industrialised’—found that their comparative advantage no longer lay in 
traditional manufacturing but in ‘knowledge-based’ industries—services and 
‘high-tech’ industry (Audrestch, 1995). Strikingly, the share of GDP and 
employment derived from smaller firms began once more to grow. In these 
areas, the traditional economics of oligopolistic competition was less effective at 
predicting development. Rather, the Schumpeterian view of the entrepreneur as 
the agent of ‘creative destruction’ seems more apt. Within this framework, 
entrepreneurs are agents who test the limits of knowledge and market structure, 
pushing against weaknesses in the hope of breakthroughs that redefine the 
landscape.   3
An important threshold question is why such ‘new knowledge’ tends to be 
brought to the marketplace by individual agents organising small independent 
firms, as opposed to R&D labs in larger organisations. Insofar as this process is 
understood, it appears that the reasons have to do with organisational culture. 
Larger organisations tend to be more bureaucratic, less flexible and less willing 
to engage in risk-taking. Successful entrepreneurs tend to be individuals who 
flout ‘conventional wisdom’ exhibiting excessive, almost irrational, optimism in 
their own abilities and in the projects which they back. Most ideas developed by 
such individuals do not succeed, and an organisational culture that carefully 
scrutinises projects against objective benchmarks is unlikely to back any of 
them. Smaller organisations have no reputational capital (individual or 
organisational) to be lost should an idea fail and are able to adapt and respond to 
developments in fast-emerging technologies more rapidly. Thus placing control 
in the hands of individual entrepreneurs thereby fosters innovation. Moreover, a 
model of ‘clusters’ of such small firms in Brownian motion allows for rapid 
cross-fertilisation of ideas across teams and technologies, in a way that a larger 
but more narrowly focused organisation cannot emulate successfully (Saxenian, 
1994). Related and also important factors concern compensation, as the 
successful development of a new idea often requires Herculean effort, and the 
prospect of retaining the residual returns is an important part of the equation. 
 
The shift from manufacturing to knowledge based economies has thus brought 
with it a shift from static to dynamic models of economic activity. Within those 
of the latter that admit the possibility of ‘true’ uncertainty, the existence of 
entrepreneurs is crucial to the stimulation of innovation. Indeed, a number of 
empirical studies have demonstrated the links between small entrepreneurial 
firms and risk-taking, innovation and employment growth. Governments 
throughout the developed world have now begun to allocate resources to 
‘entrepreneurship policy’, designed to stimulate and reinforce the process of 
‘creative destruction’.  
 
2.2 What are the determinants of entrepreneurship?  
 
The existing literature has identified a number of determinants of 
entrepreneurial activity, which can usefully be categorised as (i) individual; (ii) 
cultural; (iii) economic; (iv) geographic and (v) legal factors.  
 
At the individual level, risk tolerance is likely to affect willingness to engage in 
entrepreneurship, which intuition has received support from empirical studies 
(Wagner and Sternberg, 2002). Entrepreneurship will tend to be more attractive 
to individuals with lower risk or loss aversion, given the high variability in 
outcomes. To put the matter another way, individuals who exhibit highly  4
optimistic thinking are more likely to become entrepreneurs, as they 
systematically overestimate the likelihood of success (Venkataraman and Lee, 
2001; Landier and Thesmar, 2003). Similarly, those who place a high value on 
autonomy will find entrepreneurship relatively attractive, given the associated 
freedom. 
 
The individual’s personal endowment of wealth is also a significant determinant 
of entrepreneurial activity (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993; Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1997; Van Praag, 2003). At least two complementary interpretations may be 
given to this result. On the one hand, a personal wealth allows a putative 
entrepreneur to overcome external financing constraints, if these exist. On the 
other hand, the overall riskiness of entrepreneurship is lower for a wealthy 
individual given the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. 
 
Propensity to engage in entrepreneurial activities is linked to an individual’s 
educational and employment history. Levels of education and training—often 
bundled together in the literature and referred to as ‘human capital’—are 
associated with entrepreneurship. In particular, education, which can increase 
the ability of an individual to identify and develop an innovation, is important 
for ‘high-tech’ entrepreneurship (Backes-Gellner and Werner, 2003), whereas an 
employment history of working in small, entrepreneurial firms can endow an 
individual with a sufficiently ‘well-rounded’ skill-set to engage in the successful 
subsequent start-up of her own firm (Lazear, 2002; Wagner, 2003, 2004). 
Moreover, the opportunity cost of entrepreneurial activity will be affected by an 
individual’s current employment status—thus unemployment (Wagner and 
Sternberg, 2002), or dissatisfaction with paid employment (Noorderhaven et al, 
2003), are likely to be determinants of subsequent entrepreneurial endeavour.  
 
Whilst the ‘individual’ level looks to a person’s particular endowments of 
certain things, cultural factors consider factors that vary systematically between 
national or ethnic groups. Here, attitudes to risk and the social (dis)approbation 
of entrepreneurial (failure) success can have a general effect on the willingness 
of individuals to engage in entrepreneurial activity, even controlling for 
differences in individual factors (Hofstede et al., 2002; Giannetti and Simonov, 
2003). 
 
Relevant  economic factors include those which affect the availability of 
opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial activity. At the macro level, these 
include growth in the economy as a whole (Berkowitz and White, 2004; 
Landier, 2002; Fan and White, 2003) and the proportion of the economy which 
is ‘post-industrialised’. More micro-institutional factors include the availability 
of finance for small firms (in particular, venture capital finance).  5
Geography is also relevant for entrepreneurial activity, because of the striking 
effects of positive agglomeration externalities between ‘clusters’ of small firms 
engaged in the development of innovative high-tech products (Krugman, 1991; 
Saxenian, 1994).  
 
Finally, a number of legal variables may be expected to affect the level of 
entrepreneurial activity in an economy. These include the availability, and cost 
of gaining access to, limited liability corporations to limit downside risk, and the 
completeness of the shield they provide (Djankov et al., 2002). The legal 
protection of intellectual property is without doubt of considerable importance, 
although controversy reigns as to the precise way in which IP rights affect 
incentives (Lerner, 2002; Bigus, 2004). Similarly, the enforceability of 
covenants not to compete is thought to be a significant factor, for enforceability 
reduces the speed at which new ideas may be transmitted from one firm to 
another (Gilson, 1999). Labour market regulation may have an impact on the 
viability of small firms. Taxation, in particular the relative levels of income tax 
(for employees) and CGT (for entrepreneurs’ shares in their businesses), is 
clearly significant in affecting the ‘upside’ of the risk-reward calculus for 
potential entrepreneurs (Poterba, 1989a,b; Rees and Shah, 1994; Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998; Poutziouris et al.,  2000). Similarly, bankruptcy law will affect the 
risk-reward ratio from the ‘downside’ perspective (Fan and White, 2003; 
Georgellis and Wall, 2002; Ayotte, 2003). 
 
We might categorise these factors in a slightly different way, as determinants of 
the supply of and demand for entrepreneurial talent (Audretsch, 2002). The 
demand for entrepreneurial activity will be a function of the opportunities 
available in the marketplace—economic growth, nature of the economy, 
availability of finance. The supply of such talent will be a function on the one 
hand of cultural and individual factors affecting willingness to take risks and 
endowments of knowledge and expertise, and on the other hand of legal and 
fiscal measures that modify the risk-reward calculus made by potential 
entrepreneurs.  
  6
3. Bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship: theory 
 
3.1 What is bankruptcy? 
 
Bankruptcy occurs when a debtor is unable to pay their debts. It is a collective 
enforcement procedure whereby the debtor’s assets are liquidated and the 
money raised is used to pay creditors.
2  In many jurisdictions different 
bankruptcy procedures are available for corporate and individual debtors.
3  In 
addition to collective enforcement, bankruptcy procedures open to individuals 
(‘personal bankruptcy law’) serve an important social function of punishing or 
rehabilitating financially distressed individuals.  
 
Generally speaking, personal insolvency proceedings result in a divestment of 
the debtor’s ownership of her assets in favour of an official Trustee, who will 
liquidate them in order to raise money to pay creditors. Whilst the individual 
remains ‘in bankruptcy’, any assets that fall into her patrimony will 
automatically also pass to the Trustee. Thus future income earned by the debtor 
will also be available for distribution to creditors. Moreover, the debtor is 
typically subjected to a range of legal disabilities, being barred, for example, 
from obtaining credit, running a company, or running for political office.   
 
The ‘severity’ of these consequences for the debtor are mitigated in two ways. 
First, some assets are exempt from the process. Universally, debtors are entitled 
to retain living expenses, personal effects and the like.
4 Secondly, many 
jurisdictions allow a bankrupt debtor to obtain a ‘fresh start’: namely, that after 
a certain period of time, a bankrupt is permitted to discharge his outstanding 
credit obligations and emerge from bankruptcy proceedings. Many jurisdictions 
do not permit a discharge of debts following insolvency. For those that do, the 
length of time which must elapse, and the other conditions which must be 
fulfilled (e.g. demonstration of good behaviour), vary considerably.
5  
 
In addition to the legal consequences of bankruptcy, the circumstance of ‘being 
bankrupt’ or ‘having been bankrupt’ typically carries with it social 
stigmatisation. Bankruptcy in most places is viewed as a signal of financial 
irresponsibility, and, even after a legal ‘fresh start’, individuals who have been 
bankrupt often find it difficult to obtain credit. Furthermore, there may be a loss 
of esteem from other individuals associated with this public signal of failure. 
These effects will mean that the adverse consequences of bankruptcy to an 
individual may extend for much longer than the formal legal proceedings. There 
is evidence to suggest, however, that such social attitudes to bankruptcy vary 
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Figure 1 shows data from a recent Eurobarometer survey, in which respondents 
were asked to state whether they would not order goods from a merchant who 
had previously failed. Similar differences in national attitudes show up in 
responses to questions about whether bankrupts should be given a second 
chance, attribution of blame and the like. 
 
3.2 How might bankruptcy law affect entrepreneurship? 
 
There is an obvious intuitive link between the consequences of failure and the 
willingness of marginal  individuals to engage in entrepreneurship. Starting 
one’s own business involves shouldering risk. Bankruptcy law dictates the 
severity of the consequences of failure. Hence we might expect that a 
bankruptcy law which is more forgiving will, ceteris paribus, make marginal 
individuals more likely to engage in entrepreneurship. Indeed, Eurobarometer 
survey results show that the fear of bankruptcy is one of the most important 
reasons given by individuals for not forming their own business, although once 
again the extent of the deterrent effect varies across countries.  
 
Of course most entrepreneurs will incorporate their business as a limited liability 
company. Hence it might be thought that ease of access to—and security of—
the limited liability ‘shield’ would be a more important determinant of the 
behaviour of marginal individuals. To be sure, these factors matter (Djankov et 
al., 2002), yet even with easy access to limited liability, personal bankruptcy law 
may be expected to make a difference. This is because creditors, particularly 
larger ones, frequently demand personal guarantees from owner-managers, thus 
sidestepping the legal shield of an incorporated business.  
 
The ‘marginal effect’ would imply that a less ‘severe’ personal bankruptcy law 
would, all other things being equal, be associated with greater incidence of 
entrepreneurship. Such ‘severity’ could be measured by reference to availability 
of, and time to, discharge from pre-bankruptcy debts, the level of legal 
disabilities imposed in the interim, and the value of exemptions of personal 
assets from the claims of creditors. Fan and White (2003) and Georgellis and 
Wall (2002) find empirical support for the posited ‘marginal effect’ from US 
data. US Federal Bankruptcy law allows for an immediate discharge under 
Chapter 7 proceedings. However, the level of exemptions for the debtor’s home 
is left to state law, and varies widely across the US. These authors demonstrate 
that the size of the ‘homestead exemption’ is positively associated with levels of 
entrepreneurship, as might be expected. 
 
On the other hand, we might expect a corresponding supply-side effect: that 
marginal entrepreneurs find it more difficult to borrow in an environment where  9
bankruptcy law is less severe on debtors. In environments where borrowers have 
better information than lenders about the quality of their projects and the effort 
they apply, a ‘forgiving’ bankruptcy law will make lenders less willing to lend. 
Consider first that an unforgiving bankruptcy law can act as a ‘screening’ 
mechanism, allowing a borrower with a good project to signal credibly the 
quality of their information. A forgiving bankruptcy law means that borrowers 
with poor quality projects will also come forward. Moreover, once credit has 
been advanced, an unforgiving bankruptcy law will give borrowers a stronger 
incentive to work hard to repay the loan, whereas a forgiving bankruptcy law 
may induce moral hazard. Lenders can, of course, accommodate such problems 
to a certain extent by screening and monitoring themselves, but where such 
activity is costly credit rationing will result (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Empirical 
studies (Berkowitz and White, 2004; Georgellis and Wall, 2003) have 
documented that such a ‘supply-side’ effect exists: larger homestead exemptions 
in US states—an indicator of less severe bankruptcy laws—are correlated with 
greater incidence of credit rationing by lenders to small businesses. However, 
Berkowitz and White (2004) conclude that this supply-side effect is dominated 
by the demand-side effect documented in Fan and White (2003). 
 
How these findings are interpreted depends in part upon how seriously the 
notion of ‘uncertainty’ is taken. From a neoclassical perspective admitting only 
asymmetry of information, borrowers always know ex ante whether their 
projects are worthwhile. Thus the marginal entrepreneurs who are induced to 
seek credit by a relaxation in bankruptcy laws will tend also to have more 
marginal projects. Diluting the quality of the signal may mean that overall a 
social  loss is sustained: if lenders’ screening and monitoring technology is 
inferior, it may be that the overall cost of borrowing by inframarginal 
entrepreneurs with good projects increases, or worse still, that some are unable 
to obtain credit. On the other hand, if it is accepted that potential entrepreneurs, 
particularly those developing new technologies, do not know ex ante the quality 
of their projects, then increasing the overall levels of entrepreneurship is more 
likely to be socially beneficial. 
 
A related demand-side effect concerns inframarginal entrepreneurs. Assume 
that if an entrepreneurial project fails, it may either be because the entrepreneur 
lacks talent, or because she suffered bad luck in its implementation. If such 
projects fail because of bad luck—a plausible enough intuition—then a 
forgiving bankruptcy law, in particular one that offers a ‘fresh start’ from pre-
bankruptcy debts—will permit inframarginal entrepreneurs to re-enter the 
economy. In contrast, an unforgiving bankruptcy law, with no discharge from 
pre-bankruptcy debts, will consign the entrepreneur to the economic dustbin, as 
she must pay over the majority of her future income to past creditors. The  10
existence of such an effect has not been tested empirically, for the US studies 
have been done in the context of a bankruptcy law in which immediate 
discharge is available.  
 
It is intuitively obvious that a supply-side effect on credit would also be 
expected for such inframarginal entrepreneurs—that is, they will find it more 
difficult to borrow ‘second time round’. However, there are reasons for thinking 
it would be less pronounced than for marginal, first-time entrepreneurs. This is 
because the fact that an individual has been bankrupt at some point is usually a 
matter of public record, and so lenders will be able to use this as a screening 
mechanism. So long as some entrepreneurs fail because of bad luck, lenders may 
be expected to be willing to advance credit to such individuals provided that the 
borrower is able to give a convincing explanation for why their earlier failure 
was beyond their control. 
 
Moving beyond the level of the individual, changes in bankruptcy law might be 
expected to have an impact on the social ‘meaning’ of business failure. This is 
because in legal systems where bankruptcy is more forgiving, more debtors are 
likely to become bankrupt. Over time, this will mean that bankruptcy becomes a 
less clear signal of financial irresponsibility. Hence the social stigmatization of 
bankrupts as irresponsible might be expected to decrease, initiating a feedback 
effect whereby the negative social consequences of bankruptcy are thereby 
reduced still further. 
 
4. Bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship: an empirical test 
 
4.1 Operationalising an empirical test 
 
The general hypothesis from the preceding section is that, all other things being 
equal, a more forgiving bankruptcy law will tend to stimulate entrepreneurship. 
In this section, we discuss its operationalisation for an empirical test. In 
constructing such a test, it is important to take into account the possibility of 
reverse causality—that any correlation between forgiving bankruptcy laws and 
levels of entrepreneurship might arise simply because in countries with higher 
levels of entrepreneurship, lobby groups representing entrepreneurs’ interests 
are better-funded and more readily able to persuade legislatures to pass laws that 
favour their interests. In order to counter this, it is important that the study 
include an intertemporal component, so as to see how changes in the 
independent variable (severity of bankruptcy) affect the dependent variable 
(levels of entrepreneurship).  The appendix of this paper considers this causality 
issue in further detail. 
  11
It is first necessary to devise a method of comparing the ‘severity’ of bankruptcy 
laws across countries. A survey of the personal bankruptcy laws of developed 
nations reveals that the dimension across which they differ most significantly is 
that of time to discharge (Armour, 2004). For example, the US Bankruptcy 
Code (which is federal law) permits debtors an immediate discharge under 
Chapter 7. In the UK, a discharge was permitted after three years until 1 April 
2004, that period now having been lowered to 1 year. In Germany, no discharge 
was available until 1999, when a seven-year discharge period was introduced, 
subsequently lowered to six years in 2001. In many European nations, including 
Spain and Italy, no discharge from personal indebtedness is available at all.
6 We 
employ a measure of ‘severity’ of bankruptcy that is based upon the number of 
years to discharge. Where no discharge is available, we substitute a number 
based on average life expectancy, to capture the notion that the individual can 
expect to spend the rest of her life paying pre-bankruptcy creditors.
7 This 
measure has the merit of providing a cardinal scale of ‘severity’ that can be used 
as an independent variable in regression analyses. Moreover, legal data are 
available to document changes in this measure over time. 
 
Whilst of course bankruptcy laws vary in other respects, we consider that the 
measure we employ will provide a satisfactory test of the hypothesis for the 
following reasons. First, the other ways in which bankruptcy laws vary are likely 
to be dominated in their significance, at least in international comparisons, by 
that of time to discharge. Levels of exemptions of assets from the claims of 
creditors do not vary significantly outside the US. Within the US, there is 
significant variation in the value of assets that may be retained under the 
‘homestead’ exemption. However, in other developed nations the law uniformly 
permits debtors to retain little more than personal effects, tools of her trade and a 
subsistence allowance. Whilst the scope and range of the legal disabilities 
imposed on debtors does vary across jurisdictions, we consider that its 
significance is likely to be dominated by that of time to discharge. This is 
because even if undischarged bankrupts are not legally restricted from engaging 
in business enterprise, the fact that they have not been discharged from pre-
bankruptcy indebtedness will act as a significant practical restraint on their 
ability to do so. This is because any income that they generate above the 
subsistence measure must be paid over to the Trustee for the benefit of their 
creditors. Secondly, given that the impact of bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship 
depends in part upon the social meaning of bankruptcy—and associated 
stigmatization of failure—any measure derived from bankruptcy law will 
necessarily be a proxy for the total severity of the consequences of bankruptcy 
for individuals. Again, given the significant cross-country variance in time to 
discharge, we consider that this measure will provide a meaningful proxy for the 
social significance of bankruptcy.  12
A range of possible proxies for ‘entrepreneurship’ might be employed as 
dependent variables. In this study, we use measures of self-employment. These 
are frequently used as proxies for entrepreneurship in the literature, because of 
the close association that has been established between entrepreneurship and 
owner-managed businesses. Moreover, in contrast to other possible proxies for 
entrepreneurship—such as surveys of ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and the like, self-
employment data are readily available in time-series format, permitting panel 
data on bankruptcy and self-employment to be assembled. This allows for 
regression results to provide an indication of the direction of causality. Self-
employment data are notoriously difficult to compare across countries because 
of differing measurement criteria (Van Stel, 2003).  In particular, those who are 
owner-managers of companies are in some countries reported as ‘employees’ (of 
their companies) and in others as ‘self-employed’. To ensure that our results are 
robust to such differences in measurement, we use two separate measures of 
self-employment. The first is derived from EUROSTAT data on self-
employment, which we use (along with OECD population data) to create a 
figure for ‘ratio of total population in self-employment’. This gives a ‘raw’ 
measure of self-employment. The second measure is taken from the 
COMPENDIA 2000.2 dataset (Van Stel, 2003), which seeks to harmonize cross-
country reporting differences so as to provide a more accurate picture of self-
employed persons including owner-managers—thus being particularly 
appropriate as a proxy for entrepreneurship. 
 
As discussion in section 2, entrepreneurship is affected by a range of other 
factors other than bankruptcy law. One way to control for these factors is to use 
a ‘country fixed effects’ specification in the regression analyses, which we 
employ. For robustness, we cross-check the results with a different specification 
that does not employ country fixed effects, but includes a range of other 
variables that might be thought to influence levels of entrepreneurship. In 
particular, we consider: 
 
  Social factors: Number of patents applied for (as a measure of the rate of 
‘idea generation’ in a society); 
  Legal factors: Ease of founding a limited liability company and intensity 
of labour law regulation: data from Djankov et al. (2002); EVCA 
‘investor-friendliness’ index (EVCA, 2003); 
  Economic factors: GDP growth, stock market performance, and related 
measures. 
 
By specifying our test in these various ways, we can be confident that it will be 
robust to alternative proxies for entrepreneurship and its determinants. 
  13
4.2 An overview of the data 
 
We study data on bankruptcy law and self-employment over 13 years (1990 – 
2002) from 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and 
the US.  We pool the data (as described in, e.g., Judge et al., 1988) to form a 
total of 195 observations.
8 
 
The data are graphically summarized in Figure 2.  Figure 2 indicates self 
employment / population for each country averaged over the 1990-2002 period.
9  
Figure 2 also presents the time to discharge (which is scaled in the Figure by 
dividing by 1000 for comparability in the Figure) and real GDP growth rates, 
both averaged over the 1990-2002 period for each country.  Three countries 
stand out in the data with comparatively high self-employment rates relative to 
their real GDP growth rate and time to discharge in bankruptcy: Italy, Portugal 
and Spain [hereafter the “outlier countries”].  As such, these countries are 
presented separately in Figure 2.  Considering the three outlier countries, a 
graphical inspection of the data is suggestive of a negative relation between self-
employment rates and time to discharge in bankruptcy, and a positive relation 
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Figure 2. Self Employment / Population, 1990 - 2002 
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Summary statistics and comparison tests are provided in Table 2, based on the 
variables as defined in Table 1.  Twenty tests are provided in Table 1 for 
different potentially relevant variables that may account for changes in the rates 
of self employment.  We present the data and tests with and without inclusion of 
the three outlier countries.  The three outlier countries have a material impact on 
the conclusions in many of the comparison of means tests.  Test 1 indicates no 
significant difference in regards to real GDP growth.  Test 2 indicates higher 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) stock market returns facilitate self 
employment in the full sample, but not in the subsample excluding the outlier 
countries.  Unexpectedly, self-employment is negatively associated with patent 
activity (Test 3), which suggests intellectual property rights are utilized by larger 
corporations than self employed persons.  Self employment rates were not 
materially different in the Internet bubble period (Test 4). 
 
Table 2 indicates a comparatively greater importance of legal factors relative to 
economic factors in explaining differences in the mean levels of self 
employment.  For the sample excluding the outlier countries, self employment 
rates are significantly greater for shorter times to discharge in bankruptcy (Test 
5), fewer start-up procedures (Test 6), fewer start-up days (Test 7), lower levels 
of required start-up capital (Test 9), lower values for the indices for employment 
conditions (Test 10) and hiring and firing flexibility (Tests 11 and 12), and 
lower values for the indices regarding bankruptcy closing time (Test 14), closing 
cost (Test 15) and closing courts (Test 17).  Excluding the outlier countries, self 
employment rates are positively associated with the bankruptcy closing court 
goal index (Test 16), for which higher numbers indicate more unfavourable 
values.  The one unexpected result is that the start-up cost index (Test 9) is 
positively associated with self employment rates. 
 
Note that when the outlier countries are considered, most of the tests pertaining 
to law and bankruptcy yield the exact opposite conclusions.  We may infer that 
this indicates a cultural / structural element to determining self employment in 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
  16
 
Table 1. Variable definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table defines the variables used in the subsequent tables and provides summary statistics across each of the country-years in the dataset.  The countries include 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US.  The years span 1990 -
2002.  There are 195 observations across all country-years, and the summary statistics in this table are provided for all country-years in the data. 
Variable 
Name  Definition Source  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Self 
Employment 
The number of self-employed people in a country 
divided by the population in the country.  This variable 
is used in Tables 2 – 4. 
http://europa.eu.int/c







The number of Self-Employed Business Owners / Total 
Labour Force, as defined by Compendia.  This variable 




0.134       0.12  0.043  0.075  0.243 
MSCI 
The country-specific Morgan Stanley Capital 
International annual index returns for the country-
specific stock markets. 
www.msci.com 0.007  0.008  0.019 -0.031 0.085 
GDP Growth  The country-specific real GDP growth from the prior 
year to the current year. 
http://europa.eu.int/c
omm/eurostat/  0.025 0.024 0.023 -0.064 0.111 
Patents  The total number of patents generated by a country 




The EVCA index of tax and legal environment for VC 
funds (a lower number indicates a better environment).  
It is a composite ranking of many factors, including the 
tax transparency for domestic investors, the ability to 
avoid permanent establishment for international 
investors from treaty or non-treaty countries, the ability 
to incorporate a tax efficient capital investment 
regarding incentives for fund managers, the ability to 
avoid paying VAT on management charges, the ability 
to avoid paying VAT on carried interest, the degree of 
restrictions on investments, mergers regulations 
(including whether or not there is an obligation to 
suspend a deal until the responsible authority makes a 
decision), the regulation on pension funds in their 
ability to invest in venture capital, the corporate tax rate 
on profits and dividends, the corporate tax rate for 
SMEs, the capital gains tax rate, the tax incentives for 
individual investors, stock options taxation, fiscal R&D 
incentives, and time and capital involved in setting up a 
private limited partnership or company. 
www.evca.com 1.974  2.090 0.435  1.100  2.530 
Time to 
Discharge 
The time to discharge in bankruptcy (where, if there is 
no discharge, the average working life-expectancy in 
the country is used). 
Bankruptcy legal 
documents for each 
of the 15 countries 
considered. 








Number of Start-up procedures, start-up costs, start-up 
minimum capital, hiring and firing flexibility, and 
various other legal indices pertaining to small firms. 
The World Bank 
http://rru.worldbank.
org 
     
Trend  A variable equal to 1 for 1990, 2 for 1991, 3 for 1992, 
etc., for each country in the data.                   
Bubble  A dummy variable equal to 1 for the bubble years 1999 




A dummy variable equal to 1 for each of the countries 
in the data.                   
  
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics and Difference Tests 
This table presents difference of means tests comparison of means tests for the level of self employment as a proportion of the country's population for the period 1990-2002 across 15 countries (195 observations): Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US.  The comparison tests are based on different values of variables (approximately around the 
mean) that were defined in Table 1.  Test 18 with the EVCA index excludes the data from Canada and the U.S.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Self Employment/Population 
Full Sample Including All 
Countries 
Self Employment/Population 
All Countries, Excluding Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain 
Self Employment/Population 
Full Sample Including All 
Countries 
Self Employment/Population 
All Countries, Excluding Italy, 


















                                   
Real GDP Return > 0  0.060  0.052  Hiring Flexibility > 52  0.067  0.049 
1 








                                   
MSCI Index Return > 0  0.060  0.052  Firing Flexibility > 30.5  0.068  0.050 
2 








                                   
Patents > 1000  0.054  0.050  Employment Index > 46  0.066  0.054 
3 








                                   
Years 1999 and 2000 Only  0.060  0.053  Closing Time > 1.75  0.057  0.044 
4 








                                   
Time to Discharge > 30 Years  0.064  0.050  Closing Cost > 8.5  0.060  0.047 
5 








                                   
# Start-up Procedures > 6.5  0.064  0.048  Closing Goal Index > 77  0.055  0.055 
6 








                                   
# Start-up Days > 34.5  0.066  0.047  Closing Court Index > 35  0.055  0.050 
7 








                                   
Start-up Cost > 7.5  0.076  0.060  EVCA Tax & Legal Index > 2  0.059 0.049  8 








                                   
Start-up Minimum Capital > 44  0.054  0.048  Income–Cap.Gains Tax > 25 %  0.066 0.051  9 








                                   
Employment Conditions > 57  0.071  0.012  Legality Index > 20  0.051 0.051  10 
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Tests 18 and 20 indicate that self-employment rates are generally higher for 
lower (more favourable) EVCA tax and legal index values, but less favourable 
(lower) legality indices (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Berkowitz et al., 2003).  
These differences suggest that legal indices specific to entrepreneurship (such as 
the EVCA tax and legal index) are able to account for higher levels of self 
employment; that is, the expected relation holds for higher levels of self-
employment in more entrepreneur-friendly countries.  However, more generally 
defined legality indices such as the legality index (Berkowitz et al., 2003) give 
rise to an unexpected relation between self-employment and law quality.  This 
latter result is in part attributable to the broad definition of ‘legality’, but also 
perhaps due to the correlation between legal and other social environment 
factors across countries, as discussed in further in subsection 4.5 below.  Finally, 
note that in test 18, countries have higher self employment where the difference 
between income and capital gains taxes
10 are higher for the full sample of all 
countries, but these differences are reversed (although statistically insignificant) 
when the outlier countries are removed. 
 
Correlation matrices are provided for the full sample (Table 3a) and subsample 
excluding the outlier countries (Table 3b).  These correlations and test statistics 
are generally consistent with the empirics provided in Table 2, and provide a 
univariate measure of the relative importance of each f the effects.  For instance, 
Table 3b indicates self employment is significantly and positively associated 
with real GDP growth, and negatively associated with more unfavourable legal 
systems for entrepreneurial activity.  By contrast, with consideration to the 
outlier countries (Table 3a), some of the legal indices (such as those pertaining 
to bankruptcy laws) appear to have the opposite effect such that more severe 
bankruptcy laws yield higher levels of self employment.  As such, given the 
outlier countries in the data, we control for country effects in the multivariate 




Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. Full Sample with All Countries Included 
This table presents correlation coefficients across selected variables.  All countries included.  Sample period 1990 - 2002; 195 observations.  Coefficients greater than 0.14 in absolute value are significant at 
the 5% level, and highlighted in bold and underline font. 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
(1)  Self Employment / Population  1.00                                  
(2)  Real GDP Growth  0.12  1.00                               
(3)  Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  0.17 -0.20  1.00                            
(4)  Start-up Number of Procedures  0.26 -0.17 0.38  1.00                         
(5)  Start-up Number of Days  0.44  -0.08  0.40 0.77  1.00                      
(6) Start-up  Cost 0.54  0.05  0.40 0.58 0.48  1.00                   
(7)  Start-up Minimum Capital  -0.18 -0.20 0.55 0.42  0.11  0.18  1.00                
(8) Closing  Time -0.22 -0.16 0.16  0.09  -0.08 -0.21  0.04  1.00             
(9) Closing  Cost 0.10  -0.07  0.22 0.50  0.13  0.24 0.32  0.00  1.00          
(10)  EVCA Tax & Legal Index  0.09  -0.20 0.80 0.42 0.44 0.19 0.72 0.16 0.30  1.00       
(11)  Income - Capital Gains Tax  0.19  -0.12  0.36 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.30 -0.28 0.16 0.29  1.00    
(12) Legality  Index  -0.72  -0.11  -0.18 -0.64 -0.67 -0.74 0.17 0.15 -0.44  -0.08  -0.25  1.00 
(13) Austria  -0.13  -0.01  0.21 0.21  -0.05 -0.03 0.66  -0.12  0.48 0.34  -0.04 0.12 
(14) Belgium  -0.05  -0.06  0.08  0.03  0.18 0.14 0.21 -0.22 -0.21  0.10  0.73  0.13 
(15) Denmark  -0.22  -0.06  0.19 -0.24 -0.25 -0.28  0.06  0.66  -0.01  0.31 -0.27 0.25 
(16) Finland  -0.03  -0.10  0.21 -0.24  -0.01  -0.16  -0.08  -0.22 -0.36 0.17  -0.08  0.24 
(17) France  -0.21  -0.08 -0.10 0.30 0.15 -0.17  -0.08  0.18 0.48  0.07  0.15  -0.06 
(18) Germany  -0.24  -0.09 0.04 0.21  0.09 -0.06 0.40 -0.14  -0.01  0.27  -0.07 0.06 
(19) Ireland  0.17 0.54 -0.27 -0.33 -0.19 0.11 -0.30 -0.36  -0.01  -0.24  -0.12  -0.19 
(20) Italy  0.34  -0.12  0.22 0.21  -0.09  0.62  0.04 -0.12 0.48  -0.01  0.17 -0.47 
(21) The  Netherlands  -0.14  0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.19 0.23 0.18 0.23 -0.36  -0.11 0.02 0.27 
(22) Portugal  0.74  0.00  0.19 0.39 0.50 0.19  0.00  0.23  -0.01  0.21  0.09  -0.48 
(23) Spain  0.11  0.02  0.21 0.39 0.66 0.42 -0.17  -0.06 -0.01 0.12  0.09 -0.49 
(24) Sweden  -0.10  -0.08  0.23 -0.33 -0.15 -0.25  -0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.25 
(25) UK  -0.05  -0.04  -0.39  -0.06  -0.14 -0.24 -0.30 -0.20  -0.01  -0.48  0.09 0.06 
(26) US  -0.34  0.04  -0.43 -0.15 -0.25 -0.26 -0.30 0.34 -0.21 -0.54 -0.41  0.13 





Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
Panel B. Subsample Excluding Italy, Portugal and Spain 
This table presents correlation coefficients across selected variables.  All countries included except Italy, Portugal and Spain.  Sample period 1990 - 2002; 156 observations.  Coefficients greater than 0.16 in 
absolute value are significant at the 5% level, and highlighted in bold and underline font. 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
(1)  Self Employment / Population  1.00                                  
(2)  Real GDP Growth  0.32  1.00                               
(3)  Time to Discharge in Bankruptcy  -0.24 -0.20  1.00                            
(4)  Start-up Number of Procedures  -0.53 -0.21 0.20  1.00                         
(5)  Start-up Number of Days  -0.16 -0.20 0.33 0.71  1.00                      
(6) Start-up  Cost 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.33 0.31  1.00                   
(7)  Start-up Minimum Capital  -0.33 -0.21 0.64 0.64 0.46 0.41  1.00                
(8) Closing  Time -0.70 -0.19 0.18  0.07  -0.32 -0.30  0.04  1.00             
(9) Closing  Cost -0.19  -0.01 0.12 0.56 0.34  -0.15  0.35  0.06  1.00          
(10)  EVCA Tax & Legal Index  -0.20 -0.22 0.82 0.37 0.49  0.14  0.78  0.13  0.35  1.00       
(11)  Income - Capital Gains Tax  0.06  -0.11  0.30 0.43 0.74 0.51 0.32 -0.30  0.09  0.27  1.00    
(12) Legality  Index  -0.24 -0.38 0.41 -0.24 -0.28 -0.21 0.22 0.41 -0.48 0.23  -0.12 1.00 
(13) Austria  -0.06  -0.02  0.28 0.38  0.09 0.12 0.66  -0.12  0.59 0.39  -0.01 0.00 
(14) Belgium  0.10  -0.07  0.14  0.15  0.53 0.43 0.20 -0.23 -0.20  0.14  0.79  0.02 
(15) Denmark  -0.24  -0.07  0.27 -0.21 -0.32 -0.31  0.05  0.69  0.03  0.35 -0.25 0.30 
(16) Finland  0.13  -0.11  0.28 -0.21  0.15 -0.11 -0.09 -0.23 -0.37 0.21  -0.05  0.27 
(17) France  -0.23  -0.09 -0.06 0.50 0.48  -0.12 -0.09 0.19 0.59  0.10  0.19 -0.42 
(18) Germany  -0.28  -0.10 0.10 0.38 0.35  0.08  0.40  -0.15 0.03 0.31  -0.04 -0.13 
(19) Ireland  0.53 0.57 -0.24 -0.32 -0.19 0.37 -0.32 -0.37  0.03  -0.23  -0.09  -0.70 
(20) The  Netherlands  -0.08  0.01  0.09  0.15  -0.21 0.59 0.17 0.24 -0.37  -0.09 0.05 0.34 
(21) Sweden  -0.01  -0.10  0.31 -0.32  -0.13  -0.26  -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.30 
(22) UK  0.09  -0.05  -0.37  0.03 -0.09 -0.25 -0.32 -0.20  0.03  -0.47  0.13 -0.14 
(23) US  -0.48  0.03  -0.41  -0.09  -0.32 -0.27 -0.32 0.36  -0.20  -0.53 -0.40  0.03 




4.3 Multivariate Empirical Methods 
 
Our multivatiate tests make use of the panel dataset presented in subsection 4.2.  
The left-hand-side variable is the rate of self-employment (from Eurostat; see 
Table 1) in each econometric model presented in Table 4.  As a further 
robustness check, we use a similar measure of self-employment in Table 5 based 
on the Compendia data (see Table 1).  The right-hand-side variables include real 
GDP growth, MSCI returns, patents (lagged by 1 year), income–capital gains 
taxes, a time trend, a dummy variable for the Internet bubble, and the time to 
discharge in bankruptcy (as discussed in section 4, each variable is explicitly 
defined in Table 1). 
 
Given the presence of outliers in the data, as discussed, we are sensitive to the 
use of country fixed-effects.  The use of country-fixed effects captures the 
importance of a multitude of legal variables in the analysis which do not change 
over time (unlike the variables included).  Legal indices that do not have a time 
series variation (i.e., those that only vary across countries) cannot 
simultaneously be included in specifications with country fixed effects.  Hence, 
the exclusion of the range of legal indices available from La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998) and social indices
11 that do not change over time does not limit the 
robustness of our results because the country fixed-effects used in our 
regressions simultaneously captures each of these legal and social differences 
across countries.  In fact, the high adjusted R
2 values from the regressions in 






Table 4. Regression Analyses of Self Employment / Population 
This table presents OLS estimates of the level of Self Employment / Population (from Eurostat).  Variables are as defined in Table 1.  The explanatory variables are as defined in Table 1.  Country fixed 
effects are used in all models.  The sample comprises 195 observations for 1990-2002 and 15 countries, as described in Table 1.  White's (1980) HCCME used.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7) 
                       
Country  Fixed  Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                       
Time  to  Discharge  -0.000091*** -0.000093*** -0.000095*** -0.000095*** -0.000095*** -0.000108*** -0.000116*** 
                       
Real GDP Growth     0.02246*  0.02195*  0.02197*  0.02137*  0.02797**  0.02978** 
                       
MSCI  Index          4.22E-03 4.24E-03 5.67E-03 5.00E-03 4.14E-03 
                       
Patents           -4.98E-09  -7.83E-08  -4.78E-08  1.84E-08 
                       
Income - Capital Gains Tax              1.02E-04  1.19E-04  1.42E-04 
                       
Dummy for 1999 and 2000                 -0.00097*  -8.55E-04 
                       
Time Trend                    -5.34E-05 
                       
Number  of  Observations  195 195 195 195 180 156 195 
Adjusted R
2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
F-Statistic  608.06*** 579.21*** 542.44*** 509.41***  481.70  460.54  437.51 
Loglikelihood  Function  862.22 864.28 864.34 864.34 864.71 865.86 866.18 





Table 5. Further Robust Checks: Regression Analyses of Self-Employed Business Owners / Total Labour Force 
This table presents OLS estimates of the level of Self Employed Business Owners / Labour Force (from Compendia).  This table serves as a robustness check for an alternatively defined dependent variable 
relative to that used in Table 4.  The dependent variable is as defined by the Compendia dataset <http://www.eim.net/Compendia_Inter/Start.htm?>.  There are 105 observations in the regressions in this table 
because the Compendia dataset presents information on self-employed business owners for every second year only; the sample comprises the period 1990-2002.  The explanatory variables are as defined in 
Table 1.  Country fixed effects are used in all models.  White's (1980) HCCME used.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6)  Models (7) 
                       
Country  Fixed  Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                       
Time  to  Discharge  -0.00016*** -0.00015*** -0.00018*** -0.00019*** -0.00019*** -0.00022*** -0.00034*** 
                       
Real GDP Growth     -0.03529  -0.06258  -0.06146  -0.05767  -0.02146  -0.02273 
                       
MSCI Index        0.07675*  0.08524*  0.08251*  0.06102  0.08503* 
                       
Patents           -0.000001**  -0.000001*  -0.000001  0.0000001 
                       
Income - Capital Gains Tax              -0.00023  -0.00014  0.00015 
                       
Dummy for 1999 and 2000                 -0.00333  -0.00064 
                       
Time Trend                    -0.00075*** 
                       
Number  of  Observations  105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Adjusted R
2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
F-Statistic  203.50*** 189.77*** 182.42*** 172.56*** 162.15*** 155.15*** 166.03*** 
Loglikelihood  Function  369.30 369.60  -9.56  371.94 372.12 373.09 379.67 
Akaike  Information  Statistic  -6.73 -6.72 -6.73 -6.72 -6.71 -6.71 -6.81 
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4.4 Multivariate Empirical Results 
 
The Eurostat data and multivariate tests highlight the importance of two primary 
variables in driving the levels of self employment per population: real GDP 
growth, and time to discharge in bankruptcy.  The Compendia data similarly 
highlight the importance of the MSCI index and time to discharge in 
bankruptcy.  All of the other variables are generally statistically insignificant 
and/or not robust to the specification of the model.  As discussed below, time to 
discharge in bankruptcy is the most economically and statistically significant 
variable. 
 
In Table 4 with the Eurostat measure of self employment, real GDP growth is 
positive and statistically significant (at the 10% levels in Models 2 – 5, and the 
5% least in Models 6 – 7) in each of the specifications.  In terms of economic 
significance, a 10% increase in real GDP growth accounts for an increase in self 
employment per population by approximately 0.00025, which is about a 0.4% 
increase in the rate of self employment per population for the average level of 
self employment in the countries considered (based on the Eurostat average 
indicated in Table 1).  In other words, real GDP growth is a statistically 
significant driver of Eurostat self employment rates across countries, but the 
economic significance of this effect is not large.  The MSCI index is 
insignificant in Table 4. 
 
In Table 5 with the Compendia measure of self employment, real GDP growth is 
statistically insignificant, but the MSCI index is statistically significant (at the 
10% level in Models 4, 5 and 7).  In other words, the differences in real GDP 
growth versus stock market growth as economic drivers in self-employment are 
attributable to the definition of self employment.  The more business-
owner/manager oriented definition from Compendia is more closely connected 
with the MSCI stock market returns.  Regarding the economic significance of 
this effect in Table 5, a 10% increase in stock market returns gives rise to an 
increase in self employment rates by 0.008, which is about a 6% increase in the 
rate of self employment for the average level of self employment in the 
countries considered (based on the Compendia average indicated in Table 1).  In 
other words, the MSCI index is a statistically significant driver of Compendia 
self employment rates across countries, and the economic significance of this 
effect is meaningful. 
 
The time to discharge in bankruptcy is negative and significant in all of the 
specifications at the 1% level of significance in both Tables 4 and 5.  In regards 
to the economic significance in Tables 4 and 5, a 10 year reduction in the time to  
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discharge gives rise to a increase in self employment rates by 0.001 in Table 4 
and 0.002 in Table 5, which is about a 1.5% increase in the rate of self 
employment for both Tables 4 and 5 for the average level of self employment in 
the countries considered (based on the Eurostat and Compendia averages 
indicated in Table 1).   
 
The economic significance of the effect of bankruptcy can useful be illustrated 
with the examples of Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands, which had 
reductions in the average time to discharge (based on a change in the no 
discharge rule) of 24 years (Belgium), 40 years (Germany) and 45 years (The 
Netherlands) in the 1990s.  These changes are consistent with an increase in self 
employment per population by 0.006 in Belgium (4% of the average level of self 
employment in Belgium), 0.008 in Germany (9% of the average level of self 
employment in Germany), and 0.009  in The Netherlands (8% of the average 
level of self employment in The Netherlands) using the Compendia data (the 
Eurostat data indicated almost identical effects).  Overall, therefore, bankruptcy 
is a statistically and economically important determinant of self employment 
rates. 
 
As mentioned, all of the regressions make use of country fixed effects, which 
capture differences in self-employment attributable to other legal and 
institutional determinants of self employment rates across countries.  The other 
variables in the regression models included were not statistically significant (or 
in the odd case where they were, they were not robust). 
 
4.5 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 
Our results clearly support the hypothesis that the posited ‘demand-side’ 
relationship between forgiving bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship exists 
across countries, and being panel data we are able to provide clear evidence 
supporting our inferences as to causality (see also the appendix below). 
However, the results should be interpreted sensitively to the existence of a 
number of limitations. First, for reasons of data availability, we do not measure 
the existence of any effects of bankruptcy on the supply of credit across 
countries. It may be that this would counteract the positive impact on demand. 
More significantly, we are unable to provide any insight as to the relative quality 
of the projects that are ‘brought to market’ by entrepreneurs in systems with 
forgiving bankruptcy laws as opposed to those with harsh consequences for 
defaulters. Finally, we are unable to specify the precise channel through which 
the observed demand-side effect operates—that is, whether changes in the law 
are sufficient directly to affect the incentives of potential entrepreneurs, or  
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whether the most significant impact is through the modification of social 
attitudes and hence the ‘social penalty’ of business failure.  
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
  
Based on aggregate self-employment data spanning the period 1990 – 2002 from 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US, we show that 
the legal environment is of paramount importance in determining self-
employment rates across countries.  We develop a new index of the ‘severity’ of 
personal bankruptcy laws that turns on the number of years a bankrupt must wait 
until he may be discharged (if ever) from pre-bankruptcy indebtedness.  This 
paper provides the first look at bankruptcy laws and self employment in an 
international setting, thereby extending seminal single country studies (e.g., Fan 
and White, 2003; Berkowitz and White, 2004). 
 
Controlling for a range of other legal, economic and social factors that may 
affect national levels of entrepreneurship, we show that bankruptcy law has a 
very pronounced effect on levels of entrepreneurship.  In fact, bankruptcy laws 
have the most statistically and economically significant effect on levels of self 
employment across countries, and matter more than economic determinants such 
as real GDP growth and MSCI stock market returns.  For example, we show that 
changes in bankruptcy laws in Europe in the 1990s are consistent with an 
increase in self employment per population by 0.006 in Belgium (4% of the 
average level of self employment per population in Belgium), 0.008 in Germany 
(9% of the average level of self employment per population in Germany), and 
0.009 in The Netherlands (8% of the average level of self employment per 
population in The Netherlands).  Policy implications are straightforward: 
bankruptcy laws are the most significant policy instrument for enhancing 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 
We explicitly showed robustness of our results to the inclusion of a variety of 
explanatory variables, as well as alternative measures of self employment 
(Eurostat versus Compendia).  We also identified outlier countries (in particular, 
Italy, Span and Portugal).  Our analysis of bankruptcy laws does not explain 
those outliers; rather, we used statistical techniques to control for these outliers.  
Further research could explore more fully why self employment rates are so 
much higher in those countries.  Further research could also investigate 





In this appendix we briefly consider causality tests in the spirit of Granger 
(1969).  We report regressions of current self employment / population with 
lagged bankruptcy index values in on regression, and compare those regressions 
of current bankruptcy index values on lagged values of self employment / 
population.  We do not make use of lagged dependent variables in these 
regressions primarily due to the high degree of serial correlation in the variables.  
As explained below, this is not a significant limitation as causal inferences can 
be drawn from the regressions as specified.  The regression results are reported 
in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Causality Analysis 
This table presents causality tests of the relation between Bankruptcy Laws and Self Employment / Population with both the Eurostat and 
Compendia Data.  Estimates of the lagged bankruptcy law index are used to estimate current rates self emploment, and then lagged self 
employment rates are used to estiate current bankruptcy law index values.  There are 195 observations in the Eurostat data, and 105 observations 
in the Compendia data because the Compendia data comprises observations every two years.  The sample comprises the period 1990-2002.  The 
explanatory variables are as defined in Table 1.  Counrty fixed effects are used in all models.  White's (1980) HCCME used.  *, **, *** 
Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
   Eurostat Data  Compendia Data 
  
Model (1): 
Dependent Variable: Self 
Employment / Population 
Model (2): 
Dependent Variable: 
Time to Discharge 
Model (3): 
Dependent Variable: Self 
Employment / Population 
Model (4): 
Dependent Variable: 
Time to Discharge 
              
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              
Time to Discharge (Lagged)  -0.0001***     -0.0003***    
              
Self Employment (Lagged)     -627.215***     -291.399*** 
              
Real GDP Growth  0.028**  66.342***  -0.041  54.542 
              
MSCI Index  0.006  49.727**  0.097**  64.733 
              
Patents -8.75E-09  1.30E-03  -8.51E-08  5.73E-05 
              
Income - Capital Gains Tax  0.0001  0.648***  0.00006  0.754*** 
              
Dummy for 1999 and 2000  -0.0005  -3.792*  0.001  -2.975 
              
Time Trend  -0.00004  -0.762***  -0.0007***  -0.788*** 
              
Number of Observations  195  195  105  105 
Adjusted R
2 0.98  0.88  0.97  0.87 
F-Statistic 427.81***  67.01***  155.04***  33.15*** 
Loglikelihood Function  864.03  -643.61  376.16  -344.97 
Akaike Information Statistic  -8.64  6.83  -6.75  6.99 
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The regressions indicate a negative relation between lagged bankruptcy index 
values and self employment in Tables 6 for both the Eurostat and Compendia 
data (Models 1 and 3, respectively, in Table 6), consistent with Tables 4 and 5.  
This indicates that a lower time to discharge in bankruptcy from a prior year is 
associated with higher rates of self employment in the subsequent year, as 
expected.  This is consistent with Tables 4 and 5.  The difference in Tables 4 and 
5 was that contemporaneous levels for bankruptcy laws and self employment 
rates were used based on the view that self employment decisions in a current 
year were based on the bankruptcy laws in that current year, while Table 6 treats 
the decision with the lagged values for the bankruptcy index. 
 
In Table 6 (Models 2 and 4) the data also indicate a negative relation between 
lagged self-employment and current bankruptcy index values.  This suggests 
that lower rates of self employment cause policy makers to increase the time to 
discharge in bankruptcy.  If so, that would be completely counter to policy 
makers’ intentions.  If policies regarding time to discharge in bankruptcy were 
driven by historical self employment rates then the relation would be the exact 
opposite: we would expect policy makers would lower the time to discharge 
when self employment rates were lower (i.e., the coefficient on lagged self-
employment on Models 2 and 4 would be positive, not negative).  Therefore, the 
observed negative coefficient in Models 2 and 4 suggest that bankruptcy laws 
are not ‘caused’ by historical self employment rates since the sign on the 
coefficient, while statistically significant, has the incorrect sign.  In other words, 
the observed negative relation between current levels of the bankruptcy index 
and historical self employment rates is misleading
12 since it seems implausible 
that policy makers would respond to low levels of self employment rates by 
subsequently increasing the time to discharge in bankruptcy.  Statutory changes 
in bankruptcy laws are therefore better explained by factors other than historical 
rates of self employment (possibly including, but not limited to, expertise of the 
policy makers, lobby groups, etc.).  In short, the data do not indicate a reason to 
believe the results relating bankruptcy laws to self employment as reported in 






1 Enterprise Act (UK) 2002. 
2 Bankruptcy law solves a collective action problem. When a debtor becomes 
insolvent, creditors have incentives to engage in a ‘run on the bank’, enforcing 
their individual claims as quickly as possible, even if this results in a reduced 
overall value being obtained for the debtor’s assets. In response, bankruptcy law 
provides a mandatory and orderly mechanism for the realisation of the 
insolvent’s assets (Jackson, 1982). 
3 In the US, Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are open both to 
individuals and to corporate debtors. However, many countries have different 
procedures for individuals and corporates, or distinguish according to whether 
the debtor is a ‘trader’ (individual or corporate) or a consumer. 
4 In the US, debtors are also allowed to retain an interest in their homes, 
although the maximum value of this ‘homestead exemption’ varies from state to 
state. 
5 In almost all jurisdictions, a debtor may emerge from bankruptcy by entering 
into a ‘composition’ with his creditors, whereby he agrees to repay a proportion 
of the face value of his debts and the rest is treated as discharged. The difference 
between this and the ‘fresh start’ discussed in the text is, however, that a 
composition requires the agreement of a majority of the debtor’s creditors. A 
‘fresh start’ regime on the other hand entitles the debtor to be discharged against 
the wishes of creditors. 
6 To be sure, the bankruptcy laws of all developed countries permit a debtor to 
be freed from pre-bankruptcy indebtedness with the consent of a majority of 
their creditors, through a composition arrangement. However, we consider that 
the existence or otherwise of a non-consensual discharge is crucial, because it 
will inevitably strengthen the bargaining position of a debtor in negotiations for 
any such composition.  
7 Our measure assumes that the bankrupt is 30 years old: that is, the measure is 
average life expectancy minus 30 years. The results reported are robust to a 
range of different specifications of this age. 
8 The data sources are explicitly indicated in Table 1.  Other data sources include 
the U.S. patent office, the European Venture Capital Association, the Canadian 
Venture Capital Association, and Venture Economics. 
9 For three countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden), Eurostat data on self 
employment are not available for the period 1990-1994.  As such, to maintain a 
uniform panel (which is desirable but not essential), we used linear interpolation 
to infer the self employment rates for these countries in those years.  In total,  
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this amounts to 15 observations of 195 in our panel dataset.  In the empirical 
analysis with the Eurostat data, the inclusion/exclusion of these 15 observations 
does not materially affect the empirical tests and/or conclusions. 
10 Income and capital gains taxes are just one of many aspects of a tax system, 
and it is extremely difficult to identify a country-year with a single number.  The 
income and capital gains tax rates are often graduated so that they depend on 
levels and the inclusion rates (the amounts and type of capital gains subject to 
tax) can vary.  Each country typically has special exclusions for different 
industries, including high-tech industries in which VCs often invest.  As such, 
our tax figures are at best proxies for everything that is going on in the tax 
environment with regard to self employment.  Limited degrees of freedom 
prevent inclusion of additional tax variables in our estimates. 
11 See, e.g., http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php for a 
variety of social indices that do not change over time, but could be used to 
explain international differences in levels of entrepreneurship. 
12 The implausible relations in Models 2 and 4 in Table 6 are primarily related to 
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